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Assessing Retail Market Competition for Multi-Aquaculture Products 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper is an investigation of market competition for three product types of salmon (smoke, 
fresh and whole salmon) to understand whether supermarkets are exercising market power over 
salmon consumers in the UK retail market. 
  
Design/methodology/approach 
Competition and the corresponding pricing conduct among supermarkets are tested by applying 
dynamic structural simultaneous system equations and using similar data set used by Jaffry, 
Fofana and Murray (2003).   
 
Findings 
The results indicate that the market is competitive for fresh fillets and whole salmon but retailers 
appeared to exert some level of market power for smoke salmon.  The hypothesis that market 
power is the same for all three products in the study was rejected; further indicating that the 
market for fresh products are competitive while retailers may be exercising market power over 
consumers for smoke salmon. 
 
Research limitations/implications 
Current data limitations did not allow the investigation to cover the past few years in the 
modelling process. However the results are still relevant as there have been no major structural 
changes in aquaculture products retailing landscape in the recent past.  
 
Practical implications 
Concerns over the supermarkets’ exercise of market power over consumers have prompted the 
competition authorities to continue investigating the situation in the UK supermarket sector since 
1996. The most recent investigation by competition authorities was in 2006.  In all cases, no 
evidence of market power was found despite increased market concentration. Results from this 
study generally uphold the claim of the competition authorities in the UK. 
 
Originality/value 
This is the first study to use a model within a structural econometric framework of firms to test 
for competitiveness of salmon products in the UK market place. 
 
Keywords: Competition, Market power, Error correction model, Dynamic demand systems, 
salmon 
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Introduction 
Rapid growth of the UK retail sector in the last few decades has fueled an enormous change in 
the organization of relationships along the seafood marketing structure. Changes in consumer 
buying habits with the increased demand for convenience food such as salmon and the 
consumption of more meals away from home are frequently cited as the natural causes of these 
transformations (e.g. Connor 1993, Kinsey and Senauer 1996).  These changes have shifted the 
market from being unsophisticated into being highly technological and concentrated.  The rising 
level of concentration in the sales of farmed fish has been brought about partly by the substantial 
growth in the production of intensively farmed salmon, and partly by the increased dominance of 
supermarkets in retail sales (Fofana and Jaffry 2008). Mergers among supermarket chains and 
take-overs by multinational retail firms have led to supermarket dominance in the retail market.  
Supermarket sales of seafood in the UK stood at $4.33 billion1 (£1=$1.54) in 2010 representing 
78% increase since 2004 when sale were valued at  $2.471 billion (£1=$1.54)2. Over time, the 
share of large supermarkets retail sales has increased at the expense of the smaller retailers, 
mainly fishmongers. For example, the market share of fresh fish sold through supermarket chains 
in the UK increased from 16% of the market in 1988 (Murray and Fofana, 2002) to 87 % in 2010 
(Seafish 2010). Consequently, the supermarket, rather than the independent small retailer (e.g. 
fishmonger) is now the outlet of choice for most consumers.  
 
The motivations of this paper are closely linked to the developments that have occurred in the 
fish retailing industry in the last two decades and the dominance of supermarkets in retailing of 
seafood products especially salmon, in the UK. These developments have aroused concerns in 
the public sphere that supermarkets may be exercising market power by extracting lower prices 
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from their suppliers which they fail to pass onto consumers. The concerns expressed by 
consumer groups and newspapers such as Fish Farming Today, No. 180 November, (2003) and 
Sunday Times, 23 August (1998) are cases in point. A number of published books3 about retailer 
growth and dominance also document the growing public concern of the spiralling power of the 
supermarket retail chains.   
 
Concerns over the supermarkets’ dominance and their potential exercise of market power prompt 
the competition authorities to continue monitoring the situation of market power in the UK 
supermarket sector since 1996. In April 1999 the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) referred the 
conduct of supermarkets in their grocery business to the Competition Commission (CC), the first 
report of which was released in 2000. The CC’s investigation covered both the supermarkets’ 
relationships with suppliers and with consumers. The investigation included an analysis of price 
trends over time, of international price comparisons, of profitability, and of consumer 
satisfaction. The CC concluded that there was no evidence of excess prices or profits, and that 
the market was ‘broadly competitive’.  In early 2006, the OFT again  referred the retail industry 
to the CC for more detailed investigation due to further consolidation in the retail market since 
2000. The OFT was particularly concerned that increased consolidation and the move by 
supermarkets into the convenience sector might have distorted competition and in the process 
harmed consumers. 
 
The issues of competition and of market power come together in discussions of dominant firms 
and of the chain they operate. High market concentration and shares are commonly associated 
with the exercise of market power (Burt and Sparks (2003)). Therefore one concern in the 
industrial organization literature is that more concentration might lead to increased market 
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power, while less concentration might drive the industry pricing strategy in the direction of 
perfect competition. The strategy of putting competitors at a disadvantage by offering lower 
prices to suppliers is beneficial to dominant firms as it increases their market share or prices. In 
the literature a number of possible ways of raising costs have been identified, including supply 
agreements, exclusive dealings, wage deals, compliance costs, advertising, development service 
enhancements and vertical integration most of which tactics have been ascribed to the operation 
of multiple retailers and supermarkets in the market (Smith (2002), Clarke et al. (2002)).  
 
Jaffry et al (2003) carried out a study of the retail market for fresh salmon in the UK using data 
for the industry from 1992-2000. Their work was motivated by claims that supermarket chains 
used their buying power to obtain substantial discounts from suppliers but failed to pass these 
benefits on to consumers. Using single demand and supply equations they analysed the relation 
between the retailers and consumers for the fresh salmon using the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) methodology. The study revealed that the retail market for fresh salmon 
was competitive despite the market being highly concentrated. However, the study does not 
imply that market power is not being applied to other product forms such as smoke salmon or 
whole salmon at the retail level or upstream the value chain. In a relatively recent article, Fofana 
and Jaffry (2008) investigated the behavior of retailers in the input market for smoke, fillet, and 
whole salmon using a translog profit function. The results of this study indicate that retailers do 
not possess oligopsony power over their suppliers.  However, based on the significance decision 
parameters in their model results they concluded that retailer might have some degree of 
oligopsony power in the market for fillet and smoke salmon.   This study expands on the Jaffry, 
Fofana and Murray (2003) and used similar data to simultaneously analyze market power for 
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salmon products and complements Fofana and Jaffry (2008) by analyzing whether supermarket 
retailers of salmon possess market power over consumers to help build a complete picture of 
market power in the marketing chain of salmon in the UK. 
 
Since the late 1980s, application of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) to 
estimating the extent of market power has become very popular. Recent developments in time 
series econometrics have further enhanced empirical investigation of market power using the 
NEIO methodology.  In this methodology’s framework, correct specification of the demand 
process is crucial. While most applications of this method have been restricted to single markets, 
Cotterill, Dhar and Putsis (2000), Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Hyde and Perloff 
(1998), among others, have used system demand equations to overcome the theoretical 
shortcomings of single demand equation in determining market power. Hyde and Perloff (1998) 
developed cross-markets investigation of market power for meat using a linearised form of AIDS 
model.  
 
In this paper an economic model of firm conduct similar to that of Hyde and Perloff (1998) is 
used to measure explicitly the degree of market power exercised by supermarket over consumers 
of salmon products in the UK. This approach yields precise, interpretable statistical tests to 
evaluate the degree of market power in salmon retailing.  While the approach used in this paper 
is similar to that of Hyde and Perloff, it is more robust in that the time series properties of the 
data are accounted for in the construction of the AIDS model. The marginal cost equation in this 
paper also differs from that of Hyde and Perloff in that not only does it include a variable that 
captures capital cost of retailing but it also conducts a test for the legitimacy of the instruments 
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used in the estimation. Though similar data set are used, the modelling approach  differs from 
Jaffry et al’s  study of salmon retail market power over consumers in the UK that uses single 
demand models to investigate a product. 
 
Model formulation 
The key to measuring market power using the NEIO methodology is the consistent estimation of 
demand and cost models.  Therefore, we first specify a system demand model and then derive the 
optimality equations following Hyde and Perloff (1998). 
  
Demand Systems 
The first stage in the estimation of market power is to estimate consumer demand. The key to 
any demand estimation is to specify a model that is both flexible and consistent with economic 
theory.  The linear form of the AIDS has enjoyed great popularity in applied demand analysis 
due to its consistency and ease of estimation. Starting from a specific cost function with the basic 
assumption that commodities are weakly separable from non-related goods, the AIDS model 
gives the share equations in a 3 good system as     
  





β+γ+α= ∑
= t
t
i
3
1j
jtijiit
P
X
lnPlnz       (1) 
 
where 
t
itit
it
X
qp
z =  is the budget share of the ith good, Pjt is price of the j
th good in the bundle, Xt 
is total expenditure on all goods in the system and Pt is the index of prices in time period t.  The 
index of prices Pt is assumed to be a function of commodity prices and is defined as a translog 
price index of the form: 
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∑ ∑∑ γ+α+α=
j j k
jjkkkt PPP ln
2
1
lnln 0      (2) 
 
The AIDS model uses the 'corrected' Stone’s (1953) price index: 
∑ 






=
0
lnln
i
it
itt
p
p
zP        
where 0ip is the mean of the series used as the base period. To keep the model consistent with 
economic theory, the parameters are constrained such that the homogeneity, adding-up and 
symmetry conditions hold. These restrictions are imposed as follows:   
1  
1 
=  ∑  
=  
3 
i 
i α  
   
(Adding up) 
0
3
1
=∑
=j
ijγ  
(Homogeneity) 
jiij γγ =      ji ≠   
(Symmetry) 
 
Therefore, we estimate own price and expenditure elasticities of the three product forms included 
in the study. The uncompensated own price ( )iiε  and income ( )iη  elasticities of demand (Green 
and Alston, 1990) are calculated as follows  
 i1 β
z
γ
ε
i
ii
ii −+−=  
i
i
i
z
β
η += 1  
 
In estimating elasticities, the budget shares are ideally the predicted shares at the estimation 
point.  However, Chalfant (1987) indicated that the use of the corresponding sample share 
closely approximates the predicted shares, and that these can be used in empirical work.   
 
0 
1
=∑
=
3 
i
ij
γ 0 
1
=∑
=
3 
i 
i
β
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Optimality condition  
As highlighted by Hyde and Perloff (1998), Bresnahan (1982) showed that a suitable way of 
generating an entire family of possible equilibria is to equate marginal cost with a measure of 
effective marginal revenue. This is mathematically given as follows  
( )
i
q
i
q'
i
p
i
λ
i
p +        (3) 
where q is quantity, p is price and the iλ  term is a parameter to be determined and captures the 
degree of market power in the industry for all goods i = 1, ..., n. Theoretically,  λ takes a value 
between 0 and 1 ( 1λ0 i ≤≤ ) and if iλ  equals zero perfect competition  exists; if iλ  is equal to 1 
the industry behaves as a cartel. Intermediate iλ  values identify different oligopoly regimes.  In 
general the optimality condition in (3) can be rewritten for good i as  
( )ii
i
i
ii qMCq
q
p
p =
∂
∂
+ λ        (4) 
where ( )iqMC  is  a formulation for the marginal cost function. The procedure summarised in 
equation (3) has been applied in many single market studies (see for example Jaffry et al (2003) 
and Steen and Salvanes (1998) for specific examples on the application to the fish market. Hyde 
and Perloff (1998) generalised equation (4) to study several markets simultaneously. In the same 
vein, we generalised equation (4) to study several product markets simultaneously. Some authors 
have interpreted iλ  as conjectural variation, in this paper we have followed Perloff (1992) as the 
wedge between price and marginal cost created by an unknown game. 
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To extend Hyde and Perloff (1998) analysis, we included a variable, K, which is an index that 
captures the price associated with capital and other utilities faced by all retail outlets as part of 
the determinant of marginal costs.4  The K variable in the marginal cost equation emphasises the 
asymmetry in costs that can exist between the incumbent large retail firms and potential entrants 
in the market. Supermarkets have used this advantage to cut prices to lure customers and by so 
doing to move away from short run to long run profit maximization objectives. These strategies 
are arguably designed to increase market share, protect market position in the long run and act as 
strategic barrier to deter p tential entrants in the industry. The evaluation of competitive markets 
and market behaviour often focuses on the extent to which one or more firms can sustain a price 
increase. Firms will find it very difficult to sustain significant long-term price increases if it is 
easy for new firms to enter a market and provide a substitute product or service. The existence of 
barriers to market entry will limit such market responses. There are many types of barrier to 
entry in different markets. Bain (1956) identified absolute cost advantage5 and economies of 
large scale production that require large capital expenditure as among the general sources of 
barrier to entry in an industry.  Bain argued that a barrier to entry is a structural attribute of a 
market implying that incumbent sellers can earn more than a normal rate of return without 
attracting new entrants into the industry.  For example, the cost of land is a significant part of 
fixed costs in the UK. The Competition Commission (2000) reported that the five main 
supermarkets in the UK paid more to acquire land for development than their counterparts in 
other European countries. Along these lines the Competition Commission (2000) examined 
development costs of land in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The analysis suggests that 
development costs in the UK were typically 2.5 times higher than in France; 1.6 times higher 
than in Germany and 2.7 times higher than Netherlands. K, which is an index of costs of capital 
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goods, is therefore a key variable in the cost structure of large retail organizations in the UK, and 
it is vital to uncover any anticompetitive behaviour. This is due to the fact that land cost (fixed 
cost) and development costs (sunk costs) in the UK are significantly higher than similar costs in 
other European countries.  Several authors have examined the link between firm’s capital cost 
and market power (e.g. Subrahmanya and Thomadakis, 1980; Cheng, Chen and Hite, 1986; 
Cressy, 1995).  Although the conclusions as to the effects of market power differ to some extent 
between studies, the general inference from these studies is that increased market power appears 
to lower the cost of capital to the firm whose power has increased. Sometimes capital costs 
constitute a sunk cost, which means the cost is unrecoverable if the operator decides to exit the 
market. Sunk costs are a barrier to entry, which implies that they make it less likely for firms to 
enter the market. Some portion of the utility operations may also have high fixed costs, which are 
costs that do not vary with the output of the firm. High fixed costs results to economies of scale, 
which may lead to natural monopoly (Porter 1998). Therefore capital cost is considered to be 
crucial in the measurement of market power of retail chain and their exertion of power over both 
producers and consumers. 
 
 
Kumbhakar et al (2012) argued that estimating market power involves estimates of marginal cost 
because it cannot be observed unless there is constant return to scale. In such a case average cost 
which can be computed from observed data is used as a proxy for marginal cost. Following Hyde 
and Perloff (1998), constant returns to scale is assumed so as to allow the possibility of detecting 
other forms of market structures.  In this vein, marginal cost for each good reflects constant 
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returns to scale and is linear in wholesale prices, wages and capital as shown in the following 
equation. 
( ) kwvqMC ii iiii edba +++=       (5) 
where iv  is the wholesale price of each fish product; w  is an index of retail wage costs common 
for all salmon products and k is a measure of capital cost common to all retail outlets in the 
industry.  ia , ib , id  and ie  are parameters to be estimated. Similar marginal cost representations 
have also been used by Deodhar and Sheldon (1995) and Hatirli et al (2003). 
 
Differentiating the AIDS model holding total expenditure (X) and other prices jp , ij ≠  
constant, the slope of each of the demand curve can be given as follows  
 
1−






+−−=
∂
∂
i
j
i
i
ij
ij
j
i
j
i
s
s
zq
p
q
p
β
γ
δ       (6) 
 
where ijδ  refers to the Kronecker delta. In the salmon retail market retailers stock most of the 
product forms for salmon. In the case where each firm sells all three goods, as we assume that 
retail firms sell all three products, (4) can be generalised to  
 
( )i
i
j
j
ji qMC
q
p
qp =
∂
∂
+∑
=
3
1
       (7) 
 
Substituting (5) and (6) into the optimality condition (7), with some mathematical manipulations 
yields the following equation used in the estimation. 
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1
i
i
iiji jiij
jj
i
i
ii
z
1
1
z
qp
q
z
kwvP
−
≠ 











β+
γ
−
−×








β−γ
−+++= ∑ iiiiii
λλ
edba  (8) 
 
where pi is the retail price of salmon product i, vi is the wholesale price, w is an index of the retail 
wage rates, q is the quantity sold, z is the budget share, γ and β are coefficients from the LAIDS 
model and a, b, c, d, e and λ are parameters to be estimated. As evident from equation (8), an 
integral part of the optimality condition which depicts the industry’s pricing behaviour is the 
elasticity concept which is the conduct coefficient (λ ). The λ  parameter measures a gap created 
by some unknown game as could be the case in a folk-theorem equilibrium that lies between the 
collusive and Cournot equilibria (Hyde and Perloff (1998)). Thus the model involves a kind of 
pseudo-dynamics depicted in a framework that is essentially static.6 More recently, some studies 
in the literature have tested the validity of static oligopoly models (e.g., Nevo (2001); Hausman 
and Leonard (2000); Genesove and Mullin (1998); Wolfram (1999)). Most of these studies 
suggest that the seemingly static oligopoly models yield reasonably accurate predictions of 
pricing behaviour. The conduct coefficient reveals the kind of oligopolistic behaviour that 
characterizes the market, and there is no need to impose any a priori restriction on it. That is, it is 
not necessary to assume a certain conduct beforehand, and test for its property. Instead, any 
behavioural model is a priori plausible. 
 
Data and Empirical Modelling 
Salmon retail data for smoked, fillets and whole salmon were collected from Seafish Industry 
Authority and the production and wholesale data were obtained from Scottish Quality Salmon 
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(SQS).7 Unit values were used to derive unit prices per kilogram.  Asche et al. (2001) argue that 
the significant price reductions of new aquaculture species indicate that the markets are not 
strongly linked to the markets for other products. As perfect substitutes have a constant relative 
price and close substitutes have highly correlated prices, this suggests that farmed fish does not 
compete too closely with other goods.  Therefore data for substitute products were excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
Wage (w) in the marginal cost equation is an index of wage costs of retailers, based on  
continuous surveys conducted by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) in which over 12, 
500  samples are selected annually. Capital cost variable in the marginal cost equation is an 
index of rent, which includes maintenance, insurance, ground rent, council tax, water rates, 
mortgage, building maintenance and an interest payment index; collected from the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS), UK.  
 
The data available for empirical modelling are monthly observations from January 1992 to 
December 2003.  Table 1 summarises and presents descriptiv  statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation procedure. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Following Genesove and Mullin (1998) we use quarterly level data to ensure that the estimated 
elasticity represents the long run elasticity as opposed to the short run. In addition, the long run is 
considered because under imperfect competition, retailers are more likely to focus on 
establishing and maintaining a price in the long-run rather than focusing on short-run profits 
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(Juma, 2004). Before specifying the most appropriate empirical model the time series properties 
of the data were reviewed in order to investigate formally whether the long run demand 
relationships are economically meaningful or merely spurious.  
 
First, each of the individual time series was tested for a unit root in the demand equations. Unit 
root testing was implemented using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The tests were 
conducted with and without a trend term and the results indicated that the constructed series for 
fresh fillets, whole and smoked fillets were all non-stationary in levels but stationary in first 
differences, a necessary condition for cointegration.  
 
The second step was to investigate whether both iz  and the vector of explanatory variables in 
each demand equation are cointegrated. This test was implemented using Johanson’s (1988) 
approach, a vector auto-regressive model. This test is important because the demand model 
specified would be inappropriate if the variables do not have a long run relationship or are not 
cointegrated. The results show that there is at least one cointegration vector in the share equation, 
iz  for each of the salmon product forms. The results are presented in table 2 below. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
The fact that all variables in the LAIDS model are I(1) and that there is at least one cointegrating 
vector in each of the share equations implies that the LAIDS model must be estimated in a way 
that accounts for these properties. The estimation of the LAIDS model using integrated data has 
been addressed using a number of methods. For example, Ng (1995) specifically considers the 
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issue of testing the homogeneity restriction and uses a method in which the empirical distribution 
of the relevant test statistics is simulated by parameterising the data generating process and using 
this as the basis for a Monte Carlo exercise. The most commonly used method in fish demand 
analysis is the Anderson and Blundell (1982, 1983) technique as applied by Asche et al. (1997). 
This method makes use of recognized connection between cointegrated time series and their 
error-correction representation.  Duffy (2003) argued that the ECM formulation of Anderson and 
Blundell is expressed in terms of deviations from a long-run position that is described by an 
AIDS.8  Following Asche et al., the dynamic AIDS model) is specified in fourth differences. 
This is to help combat possible stochastic seasonal effects which could affect the short run 
dynamics of the model are accounted for by using fourth period differencing (Asche et al., 
1997), instead of first differences. One lag was sufficient to account for the dynamics and for the 
effects of habit formation in the model.Therefore following Asche et al. we specify our dynamic 
LAIDS model as follows: 
∑∑
==
− ++++++=
n
1j
t4ijt4ijitik
3
1k
iSk1it4itit4 ηΕln∆βΡln∆tαSαZδ∆αZ∆ ϕ            (10) 
where 4∆ denotes fourth differenced filter (e.g. 4itit4 ppp∆ −−= ), it4Z∆  depicts  the fourth 
difference of the budget share of the ith good, 1it4Z∆ − is the lagged fourth difference of the budget 
share, ikS  are seasonal dummies, t a linear trend, j4pln∆ is the fourth difference price of the j
th 
good in the bundle,  Eln∆4 is the  fourth difference of total expenditure on all goods in the system 
and tη  is the error term. The use of a trend is quite common in demand analysis, for example see 
Burton and Young, (1996), Asche et al. (1997). The trend term in the equation is assumed to 
capture several factors. First, the trend term help captures the effect salmon marketing by SQS as 
a healthy diet to counteract negative publicity about salmon farming. These promotional 
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activities of the industry body and similar organizations that promote oily fish have drawn 
attention to salmon products. Second, the trend also captures structural shifts in demand and 
changes in taste.  
  
Like Asche et al., we are not able to separate the trend and the constant terms in equation (10) 
thus estimated values are not interpreted as minimum expenditure on each salmon product. The 
filter in equation (10) has been argued to control for both deterministic and stochastic seasonal 
trends in the model (Asche et al., 1997). Asche et al also argued that the fourth difference filter 
with quarterly data is preferable to the normal first difference filter because it controls both for 
seasonal cycles and for unit roots such that the short-run dynamics in the data series are 
stationary. Following Anderson and Blundell (1983) and Burton and Young (1996), the 
properties of homogeneity and symmetry are applied in the long-run segment of the model.  
While symmetry may not hold in the short run, homogeneity holds by virtue of the adding up 
properties. 
 
Empirical Results 
Following Steen and Salvanes (1999); Gohin and Guyomard (2000) and Jaffry et al (2003) the 
demand system equations and the system of equilibrium conditions were estimated sequentially 
to accommodate the large number of parameters in equations (8) and (10) and to control for the 
attendant multicollinearity problems.9  Sequential estimation of the demand and margin 
equations in this way is common in the literature and has been shown to produce results that 
differ little from those obtained with simultaneous estimation (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005). 
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The demand system (8) was estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique 
which accounts for cross-equation contemporaneous correlation and as a result takes into account 
the optimization process that is essential in any demand system.   The demand system is 
estimated by incorporating the theoretical restrictions of adding-up, symmetry and homogeneity. 
Following Anderson and Blundell (1982), one equation (we dropped the whole salmon share 
equation) was dropped to avoid singularity during estimation and the adding-up restriction was 
used to recover the equation after estimation. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
The model specification is robust and fits the observed data for both product forms as measured 
by system R-square10 of 87%. The hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry conditions implied 
in economic theory are tested with a Wald test. The computed test statistics for symmetry 
restriction is 10.4 and the tabulated 2χ  statistics is 3.84 for one degree of freedom, which 
allowed the rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. On the other hand, the 
homogeneity restriction was accepted at the 5% level of significance. The corresponding 
computed value of the test statistics for homogeneity is 4.60 and the tabulated 2χ  statistics for 2 
degrees of freedom is 5.99.  The rejection of the symmetry condition found in this study is not 
unusual. This implies that empirical demand studies often found that some theoretical restrictions 
do not hold (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b, Cozzarin and Gilmour 1998). Cozzarin and Gilmour 
conducted a survey on these restrictions in empirical demand studies and found homogeneity 
(symmetry) was tested in 29 of the models and the restriction was rejected 57% percent of the 
time. A joint test for homogeneity and symmetry were also conducted. The computed test 
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statistics is 6.12 and the corresponding critical value at 5% level of significance is 7.82, which 
means that we can’t reject the null of a joint homogeneity and symmetry restriction.   
 
We use the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) to test for the presence of autocorrelation. In the LM test 
the null hypothesis of 0:0 =iH ρ (no autocorrelation) is tested against the alternative hypothesis 
of the presence of autocorrelation. The LM test has a 2χ distribution with degrees of freedom 
equivalent to the number of lagged residuals. Using the aforementioned test the computed 2χ  
statistics are 0.13 and 0.22 and the tabulated critical is 5.99 for 2 degrees of freedom. The test 
suggests that there is no problem of autocorrelation detected in both estimated share equations. 
Following from the results obtained, the results indicate that the system model estimated for 
retail demand for salmon possesses both theoretical properties of homogeneity and symmetry.  
 
The economic content of the LAIDS model is presented in Table 4 in terms of elasticities. The 
own price elasticities have correct signs (negative) consistent with economic theory. Estimates of 
elasticity in the retail market for different salmon products in the UK are not commonly reported 
in the literature except for fresh fillets. Compared with earlier studies of salmon market in the 
UK, the results of this study appear in line with fresh fillets estimates reported in the past. For 
example Clay and Fofana (1999) and Jaffry et al. (2003) reported own price elasticity estimate 
values of –0.33 and –0.62 for fresh salmon fillets. It is interesting to note that our calculations 
indicate that whole salmon is relatively more elastic compared with fresh fillets or smoked 
salmon. This is typical of unprocessed food, meaning that a slight increase in the price of whole 
salmon triggers higher than proportionate decrease in demand. Unlike smoked or fresh fillet 
which are to some degree processed and higher value goods a slight increase in price would not 
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change demand a great deal. Also worth noting is that the elasticity estimate for fresh salmon 
fillets appears to be increasing in value with time. This trend indicates the independence of 
consumers and that the market demand curve is gradually disciplining the market. That is 
customers react more strongly in later years to changes in price as compared with earlier years; 
this is a sign of competitiveness in the industry. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
The own price elasticities for smoked and fresh fillets of –0.88 and –1.02 are not significantly 
different from (minus) one, implying that consumers almost make proportional responses in the 
quantity demanded when the prices of these products change. However, the own price elasticity 
for whole salmon (-1.49) depicts elastic demand. All other things remaining unchanged, if the 
price of whole salmon in the retail market increases by 10% consumers cut back on the quantity 
demanded by almost 15%. This adjustment by consumers for whole salmon is not surprising for 
a product that is unprocessed and mostly displayed on wet fish counters in supermarkets, thus 
competing directly with other unprocessed fish products.  
 
The expenditure elasticities are statistically significant indicating that total expenditure on 
salmon products is a significant determinant of the demand for all the product forms of salmon 
that were investigated. However, we note the elasticities estimates are not significantly different 
from one for smoked fillets and whole salmon. The expenditure elasticity for fresh fillets is, 
however, greater than one indicating that demand is expenditure elastic. Earlier studies of 
salmon in the 1980s to mid 1990s typically estimated higher expenditure elasticity values as 
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compared with those found in this study. Our estimates are dissimilar from earlier studies due to 
recent changes in the market and the demand structure for salmon. These changes are fuelled by 
marked shifts in food consumption patterns due to changing lifestyle of the UK consumer, along 
with economic, social and demographic changes. Furthermore, the demand system specification 
and the estimation techniques used in this article are more robust in contrast to many earlier 
studies when the market was immature. Thus, the results in this study are comparable with 
income elasticities of Asche et al. (1997). On the whole, the elasticity estimates are plausible and 
meaningful and further lend support to the satisfactory nature of the LAIDS-ECM model 
estimated.  
 
Non-linear three-stage least squares (NL3SLS) procedure with instruments was used for 
estimation. Initial starting value estimates were obtained in a two-stage estimation procedure 
using an instrumental variable method to avoid simultaneity bias. The instruments used were 
GDP, time trend, UK money supply (M3), quarterly average of UK Banks' base interest rates, 
UK CPI, index of production by Standard Industry Classification (92) and an index of 
expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages.11 Our estimates of the marginal cost equation 
for each product form and the corresponding market power estimates are presented in Table 5..  
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A key problem with instrumental variable is that instruments are required which are at least 
asymptotically uncorrelated with the error term in the regression equation. In order to test the 
validity of the instruments we used a Sargan (1964) validity test of instruments. Under the null 
hypothesis, the Sargan statistic is asymptotically distributed as 2χ  with p-k degrees of freedom; 
and is written down as: 
 i
1
i
n
1i
iii εˆWWεˆ∆εˆ∆WWεˆ∆S ′




 ′′′=
−
=
∑       (11) 
where W is the chosen matrix of instruments, p indicates the number of columns in W and k the 
number of parameters to be estimated. The test statistics were 1.98, 1.95 and 8.14 for smoked 
fillet, fresh fillet and whole salmon marginal cost equations respectively. From the results, we 
accept the validity of instruments for all the marginal cost equations when compared with the 
critical value of 9.49 for 4 degrees of freedom and 5% level of significance. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
  
The model fits the data well with satisfactory R2 values.  An autocorrelation test (DW test) was 
performed to check for the existence of autocorrelation in each of the marginal cost equation. 
The results also suggest that no autocorrelation in these equations. 
 
Considering the effects of the retail wage rate on retail marginal cost, these were found to be of 
minimal impact with those for salmon steak and whole salmon not being statistically significant. 
This effect was as expected in that the retail wage rate is generally close to the minimum wage. 
More importantly, however, is the fact that employees in the retail sector have little influence on 
their wage rates and are therefore price-takers. With respect to the market power parameters,λ, 
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these were found not to be significant at the 5% significance level for fresh fillet and whole 
salmon but significant for smoked salmon. More importantly however, is that the market power 
estimates for fresh fillet and whole salmon are close to zero for us to conclude that the market for 
these products is near perfectly competitive. However, in relative terms the market power 
estimate for smoked salmon is significant and of higher magnitude as compared with other two 
products. This suggests that retailers exercise some degree of market power for smoked fillet. 
Furthermore, the corresponding Lerner index12 for smoked salmon is 0.0127 while the estimated 
indices for fillets and wh le salmon are 0.0001 and 0.0002 respectively. It can be seen that the 
Lerner indexes for fresh fillet and whole salmon were negligible and sufficiently close to zero to 
indicate that they are competitive while the value for smoked salmon was different from zero 
suggesting some relative degree of market power.   
 
We also tested whether the retail marginal cost function and the market power parameter for 
each salmon product are identical.  The Wald test statistics for identical marginal cost function is 
18.54 and the corresponding tabulated value is 12.59 for 6 degrees of freedom and 5% level of 
significance. The test clearly rejects the hypothesis that the marginal cost functions of each 
salmon product are equal. This further shows that there are physical as well as cost differences 
between the different products of salmon that affects retail marginal costs. The cost differences 
are reflected in the degree to which each product form is processed, i.e. smoked fillet is highly 
processed while whole salmon is the least processed. This gives rise to different variable cost 
structures associated with different market structures, higher costs being associated with non-
competition. The Wald test statistics for equal market power measure for each product form is 
8.44 and the corresponding tabulated value is 7.82 for 3 degrees of freedom at the 5% level of 
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significance. These results further show that the market power estimates for each salmon product 
are not identical, lending support to the notion that retailers might be exercising some degree of 
market power for smoked fillet.  
 
Indeed, there are reasons in the industry to suggest that retailers of smoked salmon fillet might 
have some degree of market power. Salmon or indeed fish processing in the UK industry is a 
mature and a conservative one based on traditional practices with some methods of processing 
still unaltered by recent technological innovations. A survey conducted by the UK Sea Fish 
Industry Authority in 2000 revealed that close to 40% of primary processors either have no 
internet web site or do not use computers even in basic tasks in their businesses, such as book-
keeping or inventory purposes. Moreover, there has been more consolidation, liquidations and 
rationalization of salmon smoking firms or activities within firms than any other firms 
specialising in other forms of processing of salmon.  
 
Conclusions 
Salmon products have now become affordable to the ordinary consumer despite the highly 
concentrated channels by which the supplies are obtained. In order to gain an understanding of 
the transformation of the retail sector for salmon products, we applied a new approach in 
Industrial Economics to the salmon retail market. The methodology, unlike its predecessors, is 
theoretically more robust.  Modelling the formation of prices in the market, we estimated an 
ECM LAIDS model that approximates consumer behaviour well. This is the first study to use 
such a model within a structural econometric framework of firms to test for market power for 
salmon products in the UK.  Applying these models to salmon products at the retail level yields 
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robust demand and marginal cost models with theoretically acceptable model diagnostics, 
suggesting that the system is well represented. The empirical results were derived with data for 
1992-2003 and the results show competitive pricing behaviour in general but that the retailer 
might have some degree of market power over consumers for smoked salmon fillet. Largely the 
findings from this study support previous findings (Jaffry et al (2003); Steen and Salvanes, 
(1999)). In addition, our findings support the claims made by supermarkets in the UK, that, 
regardless of their huge market share and high concentration, retail sales for salmon remain 
competitive.  
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1 Using Bank of England 2010 average annual exchange rate. 
 
2 http://www.seafish.org/about-seafish/seafood-industry-overview- 
3 “Shopped” by Joanna Blythman and “Not on the Label” by Felicity Lawrence New Economics Foundation – 
“Clone Town Britain” http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/mrrefr55lroqjwrefpvg525528082004130712.pdf   
4
Steen and Salvanes (1998), Park and Weliwita (1999), Jaffry, Fofana and Murray (2003) included measures of 
capital cost in the marginal cost equations in determining oligopoly power. 
5 Absolute cost advantage is used to describe a number of potential cost advantages that incumbents may have over 
new entrants, other than economies of scale.  
6Although derived in a static context, these tests provide a valid empirical test of dynamic equilibrium (Worthington 
(1990)). Consequently we do not introduce any dynamics in the optimality model during estimation. 
 
7SQS is an industry body that represents Scottish Salmon Growers Association, the Scottish Salmon Board and 
Scottish Quality Salmon. A new expanded trade association, Scottish Salomon Producer Organisation, was created 
in 2006 that has taken over the operations of SQS. 
8 See Asche at al. (1997) and Duffy (2003) for details of the specification of dynamic ECM AIDS using the 
Anderson and Blunder (1982) approach. 
  
9 In all, we attempted to estimate five equations system with demand theoretical restrictions imposed using non 
linear three- stage least square to achieve maximum efficiency.  Unfortunately we were not able to achieve 
convergence may be due to the large number of parameters to be estimated.  
The potential problem associated with sequential estimation is reviewed by Love (1992). However a number of 
market power studies have used sequential estimation method (e.g. see Steen and Salvanes, 1999; Gohin and 
Guyomard, 2000; Jaffry et al, 2003). 
 
 
11 GDP, CPI, index of productivity, and Index of expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages were collected 
from the Office for National Statistics.  M3 and base interest rate were obtained from the Bank of England. 
 
12 
iiε
iλ
ip
iMCip
iL −=
−
= ; where iMC  is the marginal cost for salmon product i. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable description Coefficient Mean Standard deviation  
Demand equation:    
  Budget Share    
    Smoke salmon  
tz1  0.18 0.04 
    Salmon fillet 
tz2  0.51 0.21 
    Whole salmon 
tz3  0.31 0.22 
 Price    
    Smoke salmon  11γ  13.17 3.37 
    Salmon fillet 22γ  6.13 0.87 
    Whole salmon 33γ  3.12 0.62 
  Expenditure β  7.90 0.55 
Marginal cost equation:    
Wholesale price  of smoked salmon 1v  11.13 2.87 
Wholesale price  of salmon fillet 2v  3.63 1.62 
Wholesale price  of  whole  salmon 3v  2.64 0.79 
Price of labour (wage index) w  100.56 8.99 
Capital cost (index) e  190.01 30.36 
 
 
Table 2: Stationarity and Cointegration Tests for Salmon Retail Products  
  Variable Unit root test  
Cointegration test 
Level First difference 
Constant 
included 
Constant + 
trend 
Included 
Constant 
included 
Constant 
+ trend 
included 
Maxξ  Traceξ  
  Zsmoked fillet -1.94 -0.94 -9.78a -10.83a 71.8a 117.5a 
  Zfresh fillet -1.64 -0.98 -9.03a -9.15a 65.0a 108.7a 
  Zwhole -0.85 -1.71 -7.55a -7.46a 38.1b 100.70a 
  LnPsmoked -1.25 -2.17 -5.29a -5.22a   
  lnPfresh fillet -2.32 -1.82 -5.06a -5.06a   
  LnPwhole -0.82 -1.68 -6.59a -6.46a   
  Ln(Exp) -0.77 -3.11 -4.70a -4.61a   
 a significant at 1% level, bsignificant at 5%. 
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Table 3: Estimated Parameters of an LAIDS-ECM for Retail Salmon Products 
Share Equation Smoked Fillets Fresh Fillets 
Variable Paramet t –ratio Paramete t -ratio 
α (constant) 0.004 0.11 0.004 0.12 
∆4 zi-1 0.401b 2.95 0.346b 2.92 
∆4 Smoked Fillett 0.262c 1.62 -0.255b -1.95 
∆4 Fresh Fillett -0.520c -1.47 0.478 c 1.68 
∆4 Wholet -0.122 -1.04 0.210b 2.23 
∆4  Expendituret 0.034 0.76 -0.014 -0.38 
∆4 Smoked Fillett-1 0.055 0.32 -0.256b -1.86 
∆4 Fresh Fillett-1 0.466c 1.43 -0.362 -1.42 
∆4 Wholet-1 0.275b 2.08 -0.487b -4.26 
∆4 Expendituret-1 -0.114c -1.39 0.139b 2.18 
 
Smoked Fillett-5 (zt- 0.381 0.57 -0.655 -1.23 
 
Fresh Fillett-5 (zt-5) 0.647 1.07 -0.769c -1.60 
Wholet-5 (zt-5) 0.729 1.07 -0.815c -1.52 
 
Smoked Fillett-5  0.016 0.68 -0.260 -1.29 
 
Fresh Fillett-5 -0.260 -1.29 0.730b 3.01 
Wholet-5  0.244b 2.14 -0.470b -3.64 
Expendituret-5 -0.004 1.26 0.139 c 1.75 
S1 -0.008 -0.27 0.007 0.30 
S2 -0.028 -0.74 0.015 0.50 
S3 -0.052 -1.27 0.074b 2.12 
System R2
 
0.87    
R2 0.53  0.66  
     b significant at 5% level;  c significant at 10% level 
 
Table 4: Uncompensated Elasticity Estimates for Retail Salmon Products  
 Estimate 
 Coefficient t-ratio 
Own price   
Smoked Fillet -0.88a -8.65 
Fresh Fillet -1.02a -11.48 
Whole -1.49a -6.83 
Expenditure   
Smoked Fillet 
  0.98a 3.75 
Fresh Fillet 
  1.27a 8.21 
Whole 
 0.93a 5.44 
 
a 
significant at 1% level 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates for Marginal Costs Equations 
 Constant V W K λ R2 DW 
 
       Smoked 0.0512  0.440a 0.002 -0.0007a  -0.0112b 0.79 2.04 
 (0.67) (1.51) (1.12) (1.30) (-2.18)   
        
Fresh Fillet -0.004 0.412b 0.001b -0.0004 b -0.0001 0.73 1.48 
 (-0.11) (3.59) (2.26) (2.82) (0.69)   
        
Whole 0.0024a  0.144 0.0007b -0.0004b -0.0003 0.75 1.42 
 
(1.48) (1.25) (2.32) (2.32) (-0.92)   
V=wholesale prices; W=index of retail wage; λ=market power measure, K= index of capital cost, 
DW=Durbin-Watson test statistics; student t-test statistics in parenthesis. b significant at 5% , c significant at 
10% level 
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